Cluster munitions in Lebanon
Executive summary

This report examines the impact on civilians of cluster munition use in Lebanon. It has been compiled against the background of discussions within the UN Convention on Conventional Weapons and continued and growing civil society opposition to cluster munition use. The report suggests that there have been long-standing political anxieties regarding civilian casualties resulting from cluster munition attacks and it provides further evidence on the well known problems associated with unexploded cluster munitions. The findings here can be taken as a further indication of the inadequacy of the current provisions of international humanitarian law effectively to protect civilians from cluster munitions.

The UN Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) should be the appropriate international forum in which to develop more effective controls over cluster munitions. It is a forum dedicated to developing restrictions or prohibitions against weapons that may have indiscriminate effects – a concern that is a key part of popular opposition to these weapons.

The CCW grew directly out of a series of meetings in the 1970s that were dedicated to the reaffirmation and development of the laws of armed conflict. The 1974 Conference of Government Experts at Lucerne and the 1976 Conference of Government Experts at Lugano both discussed problems associated with cluster munitions. In 1974 Lebanon along with twelve other countries, sponsored a proposal for them to be banned. However, more than 30 years later, the CCW has failed to address directly the particular combination of problems associated with cluster munitions and these weapons continue to be free from any specific restrictions.

Against this background, the history of cluster munitions use in Lebanon highlights the following:

- Cluster munitions caused civilian casualties at the time of use because the area effect of the munitions extended beyond specific military targets.
- Israeli use of these munitions in both 1978 and 1982 was considered by the U.S. to have been in breach of specific restrictions it had attached to the sale of cluster munitions. These restrictions had been in place since 1976.
That the U.S. sought to impose these specific restrictions on cluster munition use could be seen as a recognition that the generic principles of international humanitarian law are insufficient to control the predictable problems of civilian casualties during attacks. These restrictions strongly suggest an acknowledgement that specific measures need to be imposed in order to address problems associated with the immediate impact of cluster munitions.

Media coverage of this issue in the U.S. suggests some degree of popular distaste for cluster munitions as a specific category of weapons.

That Israel was twice held by the U.S. to have used cluster munitions in breach of its restrictions suggests that stronger mechanisms would be needed in order to protect civilians effectively. In this case the U.S. banned further provision of cluster munitions to Israel.

In Lebanon, unexploded cluster munitions have continued to claim civilian casualties for more than 25 years since the initial attacks.

Cluster munitions continue to make up a significant component of the broader unexploded ordnance threat in Lebanon.

From these findings Landmine Action draws the following conclusions:

The history of cluster munition use in Lebanon further affirms the need to develop specific restrictions or prohibitions on these weapons.

There is a need for states to sign, ratify and implement the new Protocol V to the CCW which contains an obligation for states to address problems of post-conflict explosive ordnance contamination.

The failure of the CCW so far to address the specific problems associated with cluster munitions, coupled with the example Lebanon provides of the failure of bilateral restrictions, suggests that a prohibition regime, developed outside the framework of the CCW, would offer the best protection to civilians both during and after conflict.
Introduction

Cluster munitions have affected Lebanese civilians at the time of their use and for over 25 years since. People were killed, injured or lost family and friends during Israeli cluster munition attacks in 1978 and 1982. Through to the present, people continue to be killed and injured by the unexploded munitions left over from those attacks.

The findings of this short report are consistent with the recognised pattern of humanitarian impact from cluster munitions. Civilians were killed at the time of use – usually falling victim because the area affected by the cluster munition strike was not restricted to the military target. Civilians have then continued to be killed and injured subsequently because of the large number of unexploded munitions left contaminating the affected areas.

This combination of indiscriminacy at the time of use and enduring post-conflict threat has resulted in protests that cluster munitions have a disproportionate impact on civilians. The history of the use of these weapons in Lebanon serves to highlight that civil society protest and political anxiety over these weapons have been ongoing for some time. Ironically, as long ago as 1974 Lebanon was one of 13 states to call for a ban on anti-personnel cluster munitions. As we discuss later, concern regarding civilian casualties resulting from cluster munition use led the U.S. Government to ban the transfer of these weapons to Israel for six years during the 1980s.

Israel’s use of these weapons elicited international protest at the time and these same weapons have continued to claim civilian lives after the clamour of that initial protest died down. These two phases need to be seen together if the full humanitarian impact of cluster munitions is to be properly understood.

The impact on civilians both at the time of use and in the post-conflict environment is unacceptably high. The combination of these problems is a cause of serious humanitarian concern.
Impact at the time of use

Reliable data on the numbers of people killed and injured during cluster munition attacks is very difficult to obtain and there are no records officially to link civilian deaths from this period to the type of weapons used. However, testimony from eyewitnesses attests to a civilian death toll resulting from cluster munitions being used against military targets in or near populated areas. These testimonies are further reinforced by documented political reactions to the use of these weapons. Israel’s use of U.S. manufactured cluster bombs during its 1978 and 1982 incursions into Lebanon precipitated an outcry in the press and a ban on cluster munitions transfers to Israel by the Reagan administration.

CASE STUDIES

Karaoun Dam, West Bekaa Region

Zoheir Ali Khoshe from the village of Sohinar is 49 years old and has three daughters. He was seriously injured in 1982 during an Israeli cluster munition air strike. He had been driving near his village when the bombs began to fall, aiming at Syrian troops located nearby.

“I had people with me in my car when the planes started bombing around us. We stopped the car and got out to hide behind a large rock. I was trying to take care of my family. I could see the soldiers being killed by the bombing as I lay down on the ground to hide. Then I felt pain in my arm. A cluster submunition had exploded by my hand. The blood came out of my eye also. I stayed for 20 minutes lying on the ground. I tried to hold my hand. It came out of its place. I was holding my hand in my other hand. It was amputated. I thought I was dead. I also lost my hearing because of the explosion and a fragment meant I lost sight in my left eye. They took us all together, the injured and killed in the pick up truck to a hospital. I didn’t believe I would survive.”

Now Zoheir runs a kiosk set up as part of a Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) micro-credit project. His shop has just generated enough money for Zoheir to organise the celebration for his daughter’s wedding. While he must still live with cluster bomb shrapnel in his right eye and knee, Zoheir is able to support his family again. Zoheir has received assistance from the local rehabilitation NGO the Vision Association – they provided his prosthetic arm with funding from NPA.
Kantara, South Lebanon

Nawaf Sabra, the Mayor of Kantara, reports that civilians in his village have suffered both the immediate and post-conflict effects of cluster munitions. In June 1978, an Israeli BLU63 attack hit Kantara:

“It happened at about 11 o’clock in the morning. During the attack 13 civilians were killed. Many more civilians died in the neighbouring village of Ghanduryeh after they had fled the attacks in Kantara. The target was suspected PLO positions, but the only Palestinian troops were located outside the village by the bridge.”

According to Nawaf Sabra cluster munitions continued to kill civilians in Kantara after the initial strike:

“After the attack in 1978 many people threw the BLUs around and then they exploded on the ground. People would play with them. One 5 year old girl, named Diala Ali Barakat was killed by an unexploded cluster bomb in 1978. She found it in the town and played with it all day. Then it in the afternoon she fell down some steps and dropped it and it exploded and killed her. We have also found cluster bombs while digging graves. In 1983 and in 2002 we found cluster bombs while digging graves in the cemetery. Now they are 50-75 centimetres underground. The rains uncover them. Ploughing uncovers them.”

Ras-Baalbeck village, Baalbeck Region

Even after two decades, Yvonne Roufael Abou Faysal from the village of Ras-Baalbeck remembers the 1982 cluster bomb attack well:

“The attacks were aiming at Syrian troops on both sides of the main road outside our village. Our houses here were protected by the hillside that runs alongside our street. Most people in our village went to their bomb shelters as soon as they heard the planes. Only two people were killed in our village during the attack. But the neighbouring village of Kaa, which was more exposed, took many casualties. I saw many people killed on the road to Kaa.”

Teams from the Lebanese National Demining Office continue to clear unexploded cluster munitions from this area.

Most of the civilian casualties caused during cluster munition attacks in Lebanon occurred when Israeli forces used the weapon against military targets, usually Syrian or Palestinian troop positions, located in or near populated areas. The civilian casualties incurred in these attacks serve further to highlight the problem of the indiscriminate impact of cluster munitions. The accusation is not that the Israeli attacks were directed at civilians – almost all of the examples here explicitly note the presence of legitimate military targets – but that the ‘area–effect’ of the cluster munitions resulted in their striking civilians in and around the target area.
At the time of the attacks some Israeli sources denied that cluster bombs had been used in populated areas. When Canadian Dr. Chris Giannou, then working for the Palestine Red Crescent Society, reported cluster bombs and incendiary weapons being used near a hospital an Israeli press spokesman denied both of these claims.

“We have not used phosphorus bombs at any time in this conflict,” Mr. Shai said, adding that cluster bombs had been used only in non-populated areas.9

Whilst it was acknowledged that Syrian troops were stationed nearby, Soviet diplomats complained at the time that their compound in Beirut was being struck by cluster munitions – and they also noted the propensity of these weapons to present an ongoing threat:

The embassy’s Second Secretary, Nikolai Perfidov, who took reporters on a tour of the damaged compound, said Israeli shells, rockets and cluster bombs struck the compound in the nightlong heavy shelling.

None of the 80 embassy staff members were injured, Mr. Perfidov said. “We spent the whole night in the basement as shells kept crashing into the compound all night,” he added. “Be careful where you step. The place is full of cluster bombs.” [...] The Israeli command here did not specifically deny that Israeli shells might have struck the Soviet compound in west Beirut, but it said, “We don’t aim at foreign embassies.”5

Other sources note the use of cluster munitions in and around Beirut. Robert Fisk, writing in *The Independent* in 2003 recalled cluster munitions use in Lebanon when reporting on more recent use of the weapon in Iraq:

“Needless to say, it is not the first time cluster bombs have been used against civilians. During Israel’s 1982 siege of west Beirut, its air force dropped cluster bomblets manufactured for the U.S. Navy across several areas, especially in the Fakhani and Ouzai districts, causing civilians ferocious and deep wounds identical to those I saw in Hillah yesterday...”6

George W. Gawrych, a historian on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, writing on the siege of Beirut7 noted that:

“Israel used several kinds of bombs: cluster, incendiary, and concussion. Cluster bombs maximized the killing of human beings.”

Whilst these reports and other case studies collated for this research point to civilian casualties at the time the cluster munitions were used, it also appears that such civilian casualties had already been anticipated by the U.S. administration that had sold these weapons to Israel.
Cluster munitions – a known threat to civilians

That this impact on civilians was foreseeable at the time is perhaps evidenced by the fact that the U.S. had placed specific restrictions on Israel regarding the use of the cluster munitions that it had supplied. That specific restrictions were in place suggests that the U.S. recognised particular problems associated with cluster munition use both in terms of the danger of civilian casualties and the likely political implications of such casualties being caused by U.S. manufactured weapons. However the U.S. administration was clearly reluctant to discuss the terms of this agreement in public as can be seen from transcripts of the U.S. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982):

Mr. Hamilton: Mr. Cluverius, did Israel use U.S. supplied cluster bombs in Lebanon? [...]

Mr. Cluverius [speaking for the Department of State]: Their use I don’t think is in dispute, but how they were used is relevant [...]

Mr. Hamilton: If they were used in whatever sense in Lebanon, is that a violation of any existing agreement that we have with Israel?

Mr. Cluverius: I believe we would have to go into closed session to give you a proper answer to that.

Mr. Hamilton: Is there an agreement between the United States and Israel relating to the use of cluster bombs?

Mr. Cluverius: I think I would have to go into closed session to answer that question and the preceding one.

Mr. Hamilton: I have a letter, Mr. Cluverius, that is from the Department of State, dated May 1978. It is an unclassified letter in which at that time Israeli Minister of Defense Weizman stated that “he was not aware of Israel’s commitment to the United States regarding the use of CBU’s that had he known it he would have approached the matter differently; and that, and I quote, “arrangements have been made to prevent such incidents in the future. Have such arrangements been made?”

Mr. Cluverius: I believe we would have to go into closed session to discuss those arrangements.

Mr. Hamilton: So, you are not willing to say, in public at least, that there is even such an agreement; is that correct?

Mr. Cluverius: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. Hamilton: You are not willing to say that there was a violation of the agreement. Let me quote further from this 1978 letter, if I may:

“The United States requested and has received a reaffirmation of Israel’s acceptance of stipulations and conditions on the use of CBU’s. This reaffirmation is in the form of a classified agreement concluded by an exchange of notes dated April 10 and 11, 1978.”
You have already acknowledged publicly in a letter written to me 4 years ago that there is such an agreement. Why would you refuse to admit the existence of the agreement today?

**Mr. Cluverius:** Mr. Congressman, I took your earlier questions to mean you wanted to discuss the content of those arrangements.

**Mr. Hamilton:** My question was very specific. I asked you. Was there an agreement? You said you could not answer that question. I am asking you why you cannot answer it, if it has already been answered publicly 4 years ago?

**Mr. Cluverius:** Mr. Chairman I was not aware of that unclassified letter. I was under the impression, until you read it, that all of those arrangements, including the correspondence, were classified. Yes: there are such arrangements.

**Mr. Hamilton:** It took a lot of work to get that, Mr. Cluverius.

Further discussions before the Committee confirmed that these specific arrangements regarding cluster munitions had been breached previously. The statement of William Quandt, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute regarding Israel’s previous 1978 incursion into Lebanon ran as follows:

There was one other issue on which we were certain, however, that a violation of a specific agreement had occurred, and that was in the use of cluster bomb units. This may have a familiar ring to some of you since we have just been through the same problem.

As you know there had been a bilateral agreement with special restrictions on the use of cluster bomb units. The Israelis did use cluster bomb units in the 1978 campaign in southern Lebanon and we did determine that this was in violation. I believe that such statements were made by American officials.

Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman later acknowledged that such equipment had been used, cluster bomb units, and that it had been in violation of an agreement which he rather remarkably stated that he had not been aware of and said that it was an error that would not be repeated.

The question of whether or not the Israelis were using U.S. arms for legitimate self-defense in the operation in Lebanon was a more difficult issue to determine, and, as I mentioned Secretary Vance went no farther than saying such a violation may have occurred. There is no doubt, however, that we did feel that such a violation had in fact occurred, but, as I said, we did not want to automatically trigger the provision called for in the Arms Export Control Act of an automatic suspension of all arms.

Furthermore, a *Newsweek* article from 1978 suggests tensions between Israeli military and political command in relation to the use of these weapons:

“We used cluster bombs only in a very few cases, and then against artillery [positions], in accordance with the spirit of our agreement with the U.S.,” Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, who retired last weeks as Israeli Army chief of staff, told *Newsweek’s* Milan J. Kubic. But *Newsweek* learned that at the time of the Lebanese invasion, Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman was unaware of CBU restrictions. After initial U.S. objections, Weizman spent several hours searching through old documents until he found a 1976 letter spelling out American limitations on CBU use. In a heated argument – the latest of many they have had – Weizman accused Gur of failing to advise his civilian bosses about possible political fallout from the lethal cluster bomb.”

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8 CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN LEBANON
In 1978, the Carter administration’s threats to curb further arms transfers to Israel led to a reaffirmation that the terms of the 1976 letter would be adhered to by the Israeli Government. These reported threats then had to be followed through in 1982 in response to further Israeli cluster munition use. On July 19, 1982, the Reagan Administration announced that it would prohibit new exports of cluster bombs to Israel.

In July 1986, in the wake of the Jonathan Pollard spy case, U.S. Customs agents were reported to have searched three U.S. companies for information about a plan to transfer technical information for cluster bombs to Israel. However, just two years later in 1988, the prohibition against cluster munition transfer was lifted.

The terms of the restrictions that had been imposed

With the 1976 letter not made public, the terms and conditions that the U.S. had sought to impose on Israel regarding its use of these munitions were the subject of some speculation as these three different media sources illustrate:

Israel was to use the munitions “only for defensive purposes, against fortified military targets, and only if attacked by two or more ‘Arab states.’”

“Under the accord, cluster bombs could only be used against the regular armed forces of ‘one or more Arab countries’ who were engaged in a war with Israel similar to the 1967 conflict when the Israelis faced Egypt, Syria and Jordan and to Israel’s 1973 war with Egypt and Syria, the officials said. […] ‘Some have interpreted this to mean a two-front war,’ one official said.”

[...] but the use of cluster bombs is subject to additional restrictions laid down in classified documents signed by U.S. and Israeli officials in the late 1970s. The provisions prohibit use of the bombs except against “regular forces of a sovereign nation” and in “special wartime conditions,” according to the administration and congressional officials familiar with the documents. “Special wartime conditions” is defined in an attachment to the documents as being conditions equal to or exceeding the level of conflict during the 1967 and 1973 wars, when Israel was being attacked by two or more nations.

Other reports suggested that the U.S. had sold cluster munitions more widely in the region, and a New York Times article of July 22, 1982 reported Pentagon officials as saying that “the United States had sold cluster bombs to Arab countries as well as to Israel, but had attached conditions on their use only in the case of the Israelis.”
All U.S. military transfers to Israel fell already under the terms of a generic ‘mutual defence assistance agreement’ from 1952. According to a Congressional Research Service report (2005):

Questions raised regarding the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment by Israel in Lebanon in June and July 1982, led the Reagan Administration to determine on July 15, 1982, that Israel “may” have violated its July 23, 1952, Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States (TIAS 2675). Concerns centered on whether or not Israel had used U.S. supplied anti-personnel cluster bombs against civilian targets during its military operations in Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. The pertinent segment of that 1952 agreement between Israel and the United States reads as follows:

The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the United States... are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

Whilst the U.S. administration was unwilling to rule that a substantive breach of the 1952 agreement had occurred it did rule that there was a breach in relation to specific conditions it had required for the transfer of cluster munitions (the 1976 letter).

Despite already trading under the auspices of a bilateral agreement to control the use of U.S. supplied weapons to Israel, and despite the protection afforded by the generic principles of international humanitarian law, it was deemed necessary by the U.S. Government to apply and enforce enhanced controls with respect to cluster munitions. These enhanced controls could be taken to represent an acknowledgment that cluster munitions are prone to causing civilian casualties at the time of use and an acknowledgement that parts of the public conscience would find the use of U.S. manufactured cluster munitions unacceptable.

The public conscience

Political sensitivity in the U.S. regarding Israel’s use of cluster munitions was no doubt fuelled in some measure by a recognition that the public may find civilian casualties from these weapons objectionable. Major M. Thomas Davis of the Marine Corps Command College (Davis 1985) noted that:

The American government became increasingly uneasy with the daily media pictures emanating from the besieged city. After the heavy bombardment of 15 July, the United States formally suspended the delivery of cluster munitions to Jerusalem.19

Certainly press reports from the time give a sense of popular distaste for cluster munitions20 and President Reagan had to respond directly to questions over the use of these weapons and the future sale of such weapons to Israel.21 After the initial reports of cluster munition use, there were anecdotal reports of unexploded cluster munitions being used to booby trap the bodies of civilians massacred in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. These reports may well have been unfounded but they serve as a further illustration of cluster munitions being held in ill repute.22
Media reports highlighting cluster munitions as a threat to civilians, reinforced by that fact that the U.S. had sought to put specific restrictions on them, was set against a background of serious international concern regarding a mounting civilian death toll. Resolution 512 (1982) of the UN Security Council was “deeply concerned at the sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilians populations,” and “referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to The Hague Conventions on 1907,” it called upon “all parties to the conflict to respect the rights of the civilian populations” and “to refrain from all acts of violence against those populations.” By the beginning of July, Resolution 513 saw the Security Council “alarmed by the continued sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilians populations in southern Lebanon and in west Beirut.” Similar formulations continued into August.

The anxieties of the U.S. administration and the representation of these instances of cluster munition use in the press are significant. The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) – which is specifically concerned with weapons “which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects” confirms in its preamble that “in cases not covered by this Convention and its annexed Protocols or by other international agreements, the civilian population and the combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”

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**Administration bans cluster bombs for Israel**

Israel dropped U.S. cluster bombs in raids

*Violates U.S. Restrictions*

Israel Admits Bomb Use

Israel Defends Use of Cluster Bombs against Syrian Forces

Cluster Bombing Called Violation

Press reports from 1978 and 1982 highlight the use of U.S. cluster munitions against a background of concern regarding civilian casualties.
The failure to abide by restriction agreements

The discussions of the U.S. Congress Foreign Affairs Committee raise significant concerns about how realistic it is to expect states to abide by control regimes when the weapons are allowed to remain in their arsenals. The statement of William Quandt to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs noted:

... briefly to compare the 1978 situation to the present [1982] Lebanese crisis, we once again have found that the Israelis, despite bilateral agreements that they will not use cluster bomb units, have used them in violation of that undertaking and once again the administration has made such a determination and shipments of CBU’s has been suspended.

That civilian casualties from cluster munition use occurred during both of these periods despite the fact that Israel was operating under specific obligations to avoid such occurrences is very pertinent to current debates regarding how best to address the ongoing humanitarian problems associated with these weapons. The Committee discussion went on to produce a rather euphemistic assessment of how this neglect of the secret bilateral agreement could have occurred:

**Mr. Samansky:** ... with respect to the CBU’s, do you have any reason to believe that was a conscious Cabinet policy or that perhaps a military use came first because they were there and then the Cabinet then found out about it for whatever reason?[

**Mr. Quandt:** Well, it is conceivable that CBU’s were simply used by military men because they had them handy and they hadn’t been explicitly well briefed by their political leaders on the restrictions that were to govern, but one gets the strong impression that the decision must have been made that these were circumstances in which, by Israeli definition, the U.S. Israeli agreement governing the use of CBU’s was not being violated.

They knew what they were doing, they used them deliberately, and it was not a case of an overly enthusiastic officer using them without authorization. I think their interpretation of this agreement differed from ours in this case.

According to Major M. Thomas Davis of the Marine Corps Command College (Davis 1985):

Although one American official stated that there was no way Israel could legally drop a cluster munition in Lebanon, Sharon brushed aside the controversy by declaring that, “In wartime it is necessary to interpret formal agreements differently than in peace-time.”

Media sources at the time supported this latter suggestion:

“I confronted Ariel Sharon, the big bluff Israeli minister, about the use of the cluster bombs. Who ordered their use? “I did,” he said bluntly.”

Despite the protection that should be afforded by the generic principles of international humanitarian law, and regardless of the specific 1976 conditions that the U.S. had sought to enforce, the cluster munitions were used and civilians were killed and injured as a result. Those same cluster munitions continue to kill and injure Lebanese civilians today.
Hasan and Ali were injured in the incident that killed their brother

**Chaat village, Baalbeck region**

In village of Chaat, civilians as well as Syrian soldiers were killed when the Israeli planes bombarded the village with cluster munitions in 1982. Mohamed Ahmad Hajj Hasan, a 38-year-old farmer, remembers the attack:

“We were still sleeping when the Israeli airplanes came and started attacking, they were attacking the Syrians. The planes came. We heard the bombardment but didn’t see it. When the planes had left the explosions started. Many people died, both civilians and soldiers. What remained in the ground was just as dangerous, they are still killing people today.”

Mohamed and his family took cover in their shelter as soon as they heard the planes approaching, but other villagers were not able to escape the area covered by the cluster bombs as they fell from the aircraft overhead.

“During the 1982 attack many people died. Civilians and military people died.”

On 10 October 2001, his four children, including his twin boys, were playing in a field behind their house.

“While playing around in the field they found something, all four of them. Three were injured and one killed. The boys who stayed alive had to stay in the hospital for 2 years. They lost 2 years of education. My son Hasan has only started walking again last year. The psychological shock is severe. We are unable to live normally.” Eight-year-old Hasan Ahmad Hajj Hasan (left) tells the story of the day his other brother died:

“We were playing behind the garden. We found something on the ground. We picked it up and then we threw it away again and it exploded. My brother died. He was the one who had been holding it.”

They had found an unexploded submunition from a cluster bomb – a BLU-63. When one of the twins threw it, it exploded killing him and injuring his brothers standing a few metres away.

Mohamed survived the threat presented by cluster munitions at the time of the attack, other civilians were not so lucky. His children, not even born at that time, have fallen victim to the enduring threat of cluster munitions in the post-conflict environment.
Post-conflict impact

That the use of cluster bombs created an ongoing threat to the local population was recognised at the time of the attacks. Press reports noted the preponderance of unexploded munitions, and the tendency for accidents to occur days or weeks after the initial strikes.

"These are not good bombs," said Selim Sharaf-Eddin, 60, a Lebanese farmer in Kfar Tibn, as he showed visitors the holes in his ceiling, the small craters in his fields and the tell-tale shell casings. "Thanks be to God, none of my family were hurt," the father of seven exclaimed. He said the bombs fell on his home the night of March 16, the second day of the Israeli invasion.

He pulled two tan cans from behind his garden wall and gingerly took out a handful of dart-covered metal spheres, each the size of a lemon and weighing about a pound each. "These didn't go off," he said.

One reliable source said the bombs have been used so often in the past four years in Lebanon that in some areas fragments are "as common as pine cones in a pine forest."

Quoted in a New York Times article of 25 June, 1982 an Israeli commander highlighted the risk the unexploded cluster munitions presented to his own troops:

In an order of the day to the Israeli military last weekend, General Eytan said that "eight soldiers were recently wounded as a result of a lack of discipline and a disregard for security rules. These soldiers picked up remains of cluster bombs as souvenirs and were hurt."

These reports served only as an early indication of the explosive threat that was to persist in many areas for over 20 years. Many communities still live with this contamination and deaths and injuries continue to occur.

Cluster munition contamination has made up a significant proportion of the broad unexploded ordnance threat in Lebanon. The Landmine Impact Survey published in 2004 recorded 331 mined areas and 117 areas contaminated by UXO only. The Survey singles out cluster munitions as a primary source of UXO in Lebanon, noting the "reported importance of CBU contamination in many areas." 27

A number of other credible sources have noted the particular threat posed by cluster munitions ahead of other forms of unexploded ordnance. Laurence Desvignes, an experienced mine action worker with the ICRC reports that:

The main danger for society comes from anti-personnel mines and UXO, especially cluster bomb submunitions. 28

Likewise the 2003 Landmine Monitor Report quotes a UN peacekeeping force commander describing "dud cluster submunitions in South Lebanon as perhaps the most dangerous UXO, including the air-dropped BLU-63/B and Mk.-118 Rockeye submunitions and the artillery-delivered M43E1 submunition." 29

Data on clearance activities also highlight the significance of continued cluster munition contamination long after the attacks. According to the 2002 Landmine Monitor Report from May 2001-March 2002, the Lebanon Army Engineering Corps cleared 1,422 cluster bombs from South Lebanon and West Bekaa and in 2001, the Syrian Army cleared 1,125 cluster bombs in addition to other UXO.

Blood on the broken spade of 15 year old Ayoub Hussain Ayoub – killed when he struck an unexploded cluster munition whilst working on a construction site in July 2005.
Post-conflict casualties

The Lebanese National Demining Office (NDO), responsible for tackling contamination from explosive ordnance, has recorded approximately 200 civilian casualties from unexploded cluster munitions since they began tracking mine and ordnance victims. From 2001 to September 2004 they recorded 106 casualties, however these were caused by a mixture of landmines, cluster munitions and other types of unexploded ordnance.

An analysis of casualties from 2000 to 2004 found that 94 per cent were male. That men make up a high proportion of ordnance casualties is common to many post-conflict environments (Landmine Action, 2005).

A reduction in recorded casualties between 2001 and 2004 has been attributed to successful mine risk education and major clearance activities in the most highly afflicted areas in the south. While the annual number of casualties has been significantly reduced, remaining landmines and ordnance have continued to affect the confidence of people living in the affected areas and of those who might otherwise return.

Other forms of impact

The NDO also notes that cluster munition contamination sometimes prevents people from using their land. A number of the examples in this report relate how people were killed or injured during livelihood activities, such as digging during construction or farming.

However, other case studies note that people will take risks with the cluster munitions – moving them out of the way or burning them – in an effort to reduce the economic impact of land denial. Economic pressure often makes complete abandonment of land impossible. Thus whilst it is not possible to assert that cluster munition contamination consistently causes denial of economic resources, this is only because local people regularly take increased risks by engaging with these items.
Arnoun, South Lebanon

The mayor of Arnoun, Akil Ajami describes the history of cluster munition contamination around the town:

“Cluster bombs were used from aircraft and artillery in 1978 and 1982 and on several other occasions up until 2000. The targets were PLO troop positions located in the town. Some civilians were killed and injured during the attack, but most had already abandoned the town. BLU63 and M43 submunitions are found every season after ploughing takes place. Many are subsurface and they cannot be cleared. Recently, one worker was injured during the construction of a wall around a house.”

Since the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000 certain areas of land around the town have not been used for construction or agriculture because of the threat of cluster munitions. However, as more people return to the south, the need for additional land is putting them at risk.

Abd El Hussein Marouni is a farmer in Arnoun. Cluster munitions lay both on the surface and buried underneath the fields on the hillside above his house. Community liaison officers from the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in South Lebanon have advised him not to use this land for his crops. However, in the month before this research took place he had found two BLU63 cluster bomblets whilst preparing this contaminated land to plant more crops. In total, Abd El Hussein Marouni has found 25 BLU63 bomblets on his land since he returned to it in 2000. The pressures of providing for his family have led him to take risks with the unexploded submunitions.

Kamed El Lawz village, West Bekaa Region

The road to Kamed El Lawz in West Bekaa passes by two hills reported to be heavily contaminated with cluster munitions. According to Dr. Ltief, director of a local NGO called the Vision Association, more than 36 civilians have been injured by cluster munitions on these hills. Because of the high number of injuries most local people avoid the area, but it is not marked or fenced.

Many of the houses in this area are constructed on or next to cluster munition contaminated sites. Munitions are often only discovered during digging or ploughing – activities that have a high risk of detonating the buried ordnance. After two civilians were killed by unexploded submunitions here, warning signs were put up. However, local people removed the signs almost as soon as they had been erected. This practice is reported to be common in Lebanon because the signs, often made of metal, represent valuable resources in such poor communities.

Mohammed Ajaj Ghandour is the mayor of Kamed El Lawz:

“The cluster bombs are there because of air raids and shelling bombardments. Usually a plane came and went and left munitions that kill people afterwards. In the village we had more than one incident during the Israeli invasion, mainly during June, July and August of 1982. On one occasion three children were playing next to their house. They found something and it killed them. The girl was Salwa Mohammed Ezzatfous, eight years old. The boys
Dar El Ahmar, West Bekaa Region

Dr. Abou Ltief runs a rehabilitation and risk education NGO called the Vision Association in Dar El Ahmar. He reports that virtually all of the mine or UXO victims he has treated have been injured by unexploded cluster submunitions. Last year the clinic fitted 11 cluster munition victims with prosthetics.

The risk education work of the organisation also focuses on the dangers of the submunitions. They produce leaflets and posters on the threat from submunitions and distribute them through activities in schools, youth camps or in the broader community.

Hadi and Rashid are two cluster munition survivors that Vision Association has treated. They received medical care at the clinic and now they are enrolled on an information technology course being run at the clinic – part of a rehabilitation programme for accident survivors.

Hadi Elbeh, 31 from Rashaya and Rashid El Bacha (right), 24 from Dar El Ahmar were both injured by M43 cluster submunitions. Hadi Elbeh injured his right hand and arm, as well as his head and left eye:

“I was helping my father with the farming activities. I was walking around and then I slipped and fell down on something, it was an M43 cluster bomb, and it exploded. There were many M43 cluster bombs in that field. The bombs are there since the Israeli invasion. I am a daily worker, usually in contract work. But I am unable to work now because of the injury to my right hand.”

Rashid El Bacha lost his right arm to a cluster bomb in 1989.

“I got injured after the invasion. I was playing in a field in the village. While walking around we found something. We wanted to know what it was so we came close and moved it. It exploded. Now we see them a lot. We see M42s and M43s.”

were both nine years old. There are still heavily contaminated areas, near houses, next to irrigation sites, and on the road to Lussy, the next village. The whole region was bombarded during the invasion. We don’t know where all the munitions were used. There is also a problem with shepherds who collect these cluster bombs because they are worried about having accidents. They set fire to them or hide them in their houses.”

Ali Mohamed Fares (left), a 47 year old local farmer reported that he had collected come 50 submunitions and set fire to them. He said he removed the munitions from his land so that it would be safer to farm and safer for his children to play. Setting fire to the unexploded submunitions is perceived as a safe way of neutralising the danger they pose.
Conclusions

The history of cluster munition use in Lebanon serves to highlight the two humanitarian problems associated with these weapons. The material here strongly reaffirms the need for specific measures to address these humanitarian problems. This material also presents salutary evidence about the effectiveness of control regimes – in this example the specific conditions applied to the sale of the cluster munitions by the U.S. Government. We highlight the following specific points:

**IMPACT AT THE TIME OF USE:**

- Cluster munitions caused civilian casualties at the time of use because the area effect of the munitions extended beyond specific military targets.
- Israeli use of these munitions in both 1978 and 1982 was considered by the U.S. to have been in breach of specific restrictions it had attached to the sale of cluster munitions. These restrictions had been in place since 1976.
- That the U.S. sought to impose these specific restrictions on cluster munition use can be seen as a recognition that the generic principles of international humanitarian law are insufficient to control the predictable problems of civilian casualties during attacks. These restrictions strongly suggest an acknowledgement that specific measures need to be imposed in order to address problems associated with the immediate impact of cluster munitions.
- That Israel was twice held by the U.S. to have used cluster munitions in breach of its restrictions suggests that stronger mechanisms would be needed in order to protect civilians effectively. In this case the U.S. banned further provision of cluster munitions to Israel.

**POST-CONFLICT IMPACT**

- In Lebanon, unexploded cluster munitions have continued to claim civilian casualties for more than 25 years since the initial attacks.
- Cluster munitions continue to make up a significant component of the broader unexploded ordnance threat in Lebanon.

**ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS**

- The history of cluster munition use in Lebanon strongly affirms the need to develop specific restrictions or prohibitions on these weapons.
- There is a need for states to sign, ratify and implement the new Protocol V to the CCW which contains an obligation for states to address problems of post-conflict explosive ordnance contamination.
- The CCW’s reaffirmation of “the need to continue the codification and progressive development of the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict” and its concern regarding weapons with indiscriminate effects should make it the appropriate forum for the development of such restrictions or prohibitions. However, the CCW has so far failed to adopt a clear mandate to discuss the specific problems relating to cluster munitions both at the time of use and as a post-conflict threat.
- The failure of the CCW so far to address the specific problems associated with cluster munitions, coupled with the example Lebanon provides of the failure of bilateral restrictions, suggests that a prohibition regime, developed outside the framework of the CCW, would offer the best protection to civilians both during and after conflict.
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This U.S. manufactured cluster bomb unit contained BLU63 submunitions. It had been brought here from the old town and the residents reported that it would likely be used as a trough for animals to drink from or sold as scrap metal.
Approximate locations of residual cluster munition contamination

Red shading based on data from the National Demining Office on the location of recently identified cluster munition strikes. Locations of case studies in this report are also highlighted.
Endnotes


2. The proposal for a ban on cluster munitions was made in Document CDDH/DT/2 of 21 February 1974, submitted by Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. The Working Paper was resubmitted at the Diplomatic Conference in Lucerne from 24 September to 18 October 1974 by Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. Point II of that proposal reads as follows:

II. Anti-personnel fragmentation weapons

Anti-personnel cluster warheads or other devices with many bomblets which act through the ejection of a great number of small-calibred fragments or pellets are prohibited for use. See ICRC, Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (Second Session – Lugano, 28.1 – 26.2.1976), Report, Geneva, 1976.

3. From Moyes & Rappert 2004, p.1


8. The U.S. Government’s reluctance to discuss the use of cluster munitions was also noted during the Vietnam War. Eric Prokosch in The Technology of Killing notes that: “another contributing factor to the damage of civilians was that despite the huge numbers of cluster bombs dropped over Indochina, the secrecy and silence surrounding their use precluded any public debate which could have led to tighter restrictions. It is clear now that the silence was deliberate.” (P.97). He goes on: “The secret cable of 22 Jan 1965 also informed (the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific) that ‘the CBU-2/A and the CBU-14, which used the same BLU-3 bomblet, are unclassified munitions and there are no restrictions on their use. (…) It is important that no publicity be given to the use of these weapons…” As the military advantage of secrecy would be lost once the bombs were used, the warning can only have been intended to forestall public criticism over the nature of the weapon” (P.99)


10. Wat T. Cluverius IV, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State – speaking on behalf of the administration and in particular Under Secretary of State Walter Stoessel.


12. Jonathan Pollard was a former United States Navy intelligence officer who pled guilty and was convicted of spying for an ally (Israel), and in 1986 received a life sentence.
13 Congressional Research Service (2005b) – other media sources at the time suggested that it was an open secret that Israel had developed cluster munitions and that these stories were being leaked out by bodies disgruntled with the generally cooperative state of U.S.-Israeli relations.


The decision elicited some protest at the time: “WASHINGTON (AP) — President Reagan has lifted a six-year ban on U.S. export of cluster bombs to Israel on the understanding that the weapons will not be used against civilian targets. The decision was denounced by Ambassador Clovis Maksoud, the League of Arab Nations’ representative in the United States, who called it “shocking,” “very provocative” and “sickening.” Reagan banned the sale of such munitions to Israel after that country used them against civilian target areas in Lebanon in violation of Israeli assurances to the United States. [The Valley Independent, Dec 1988 syndicated from Associated Press].”

15 Lebanon, who is to blame? Jack Anderson writing in The Valley Independent, 16 August 1982

16 From a UPI syndicated report quoted on July 4, 1982


19 Original source cited Major Davis is Bavly, Dan and Eliahi Salpeter. Fire In Beirut. New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, Inc., 1984, p.107 – which he describes as “a book by two Israeli authors highly critical of the rationale for the 1982 war as well as the Begin government in general. The book contains certain inaccuracies on its military reporting, but is quite accurate on the diplomatic efforts undertaken.”

20 For example:

(1) WASHINGTON (UPI) - Sen. James Abourezk, D-S.D. the only senator of Lebanese descent, today denounced Israel for “barbaric killing of innocent civilians” by using cluster bombs [...] Abourezk called Israeli use of the cluster bombs – an anti-personnel weapon – “barbarism.” [March 21, 1978]

(2) A cluster bomb is a 10-foot-long canister filled with hundreds of small, shrapnel-laden bomblets. Dropped from a plane, the “cluster bomb unit” (CBU) splits open in mid-air, spewing out the bomblets and saturating an area of several hundred square yards with steel shards. [...] A murderous anti-personnel weapon, the bomb was first used to suppress anti-aircraft fire in Vietnam. [The Cluster Bomb Furor, Newsweek April 24, 1978]

(3) Israeli bombing attacks (including use of cluster bombs in densely populated areas) and artillery fire have left large numbers of civilians dead and wounded, including women and children. The International Red Cross estimates that as many as 600,000 people have been left homeless in southern Lebanon. [Syracuse Post Standard, June 24, 1982]

(4) BEIRUT, Lebanon – Civilian casualties in Israel’s war against the Palestinians may be approaching 20,000 dead, according to medical authorities, international relief agencies and the Lebanese police [...] European and Lebanese doctors said that many of the victims they treated had been hit by cluster bombs. The White House has said the United States sold Israel the bombs with certain conditions attached [Syracuse Post Standard, July 12, 1982 – syndicated from Los Angeles Times]

(5) To back up the charge that the Israelis were using lethal cluster bombs supplied by the U.S. in
civilians, the P.L.O. last week put on display parts of one type of the weapon that it claimed had been found in Lebanon. The U.S. had provided the Israelis with two models of the bomb, both of which work on the same principle. The Mark 20 Rockeye scatters eight-inch steel darts and the Cluster Bomb Unit 58 sprays bomblets armed with a charge that explodes on impact [...] Because the bombs indiscriminately blast an area several hundred feet in diameter, they are clearly unsuited for use in civilian neighborhoods. [Controversial Clusters, in *Time Magazine*, July 12, 1982.]

(6) Lebanon: who’s to blame? WASHINGTON – A smoldering question mark hangs over the ruins of Beirut: Who is to blame for the indiscriminate killing of civilians? [...] purchased from the U.S. Navy [...] canisters like these, dropped by Israeli planes, had opened over Beirut; each had scattered hundreds of golf ball sized bomblets over a neighbourhood, he said. Then each tiny ball had exploded like a grenade, raining down lethal shrapnel on the populace below. [The *Valley Independent*, August 1982]

21 Reagan Responds to Reporters Regarding Arms for Israel (July 18, 1982) quoted from "Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, 1982", online at www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/U.S.-Israel/RR7_18_82.html

22 “Excerpts from report on Israelis’ responsibility in massacre”, *New York Times*, February 9, 1983. These reports were dismissed as unfounded by an Israeli investigation – they are noted here only as further evidence of cluster munitions’ ill repute.


24 Preamble to the main text of the CCW (1980). It is worth noting that public opposition to the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons during the Vietnam War was one of the driving forces between the CCW’s development of a Protocol restricting the use of such weapons. Eric Prokosch (1995 p.170) notes: “Of the three protocols agreed on by the U.N. conference in 1980, it is not surprising that the most important was on the weapons against which there had been the strongest recent outcry: incendiaries. The Vietnam war protests over napalm had their echo in Geneva when the conference adopted Protocol III to the new convention.”


26 Lebanon, who is to blame? Jack Anderson writing in *The Valley Independent*, 16 August 1982

27 Landmine Impact Survey 2004

28 Desvignes 2005

29 Landmine Monitor Report, 2003


31 National Demining Office website: www.ndo-lb.org/Results.tpl?rnd=1782&cart=109084458217010695&category=2&startat=1


33 The cluster munitions commonly reported to have been used in Lebanon are all impact activated (rather than time-delay fused). It is uncertain here if the mayor is referring to problems from the cluster munitions after the initial attack or at the time of the attack.