Let’s finish the job

‘The 1997 Mine Ban Convention remains the most relevant and practical international instrument for addressing the problem of land mines. We should rather focus on fully implementing the Convention than encourage diversion from it.’

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This edition of Campaign covers key policy challenges facing the global campaign against landmines and explosive remnants of war.

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Rajkaur, Landmine survivor, Rajasthan, India
By Steffen Kongstad  
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How much land should be demined? Some attention has recently been directed to this particular aspect of mine action. This is good. There needs to be a continuous reflection on what we are doing, how we are doing it and what we are actually achieving. It seems, however, that we also need to remind ourselves of why we are doing it.

The ongoing debate is sometimes confused. The arguments are driven by different motives. Some views reflect complacency, ignorance or even irresponsibility. But for the majority of states affected, the starting point for the discussion is Article 5 of the 1997 Mine Ban Convention.

The international mine ban movement that gathered momentum in the early 1990s was a response to the growing recognition that mines represented a humanitarian disaster that was directly and indirectly damaging the lives of millions of men, women and children. This led to deep indignation over a problem that was easy to understand, and also considered to be easy to address and remedy.

Of course, the problem, and the possibility of solving it, were not recognised by all. This is still the case. The movement, which led to the Ottawa Process and to the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, had its opponents. The success of the process is still subject to some opposition and ridicule. That may be less important and ignorable. But what cannot be ignored are the attempts to complicate the issue and blur the obligations. It is probably no coincidence that the most articulate ‘complicators’ are those with no political or legal obligations towards a world free of anti-personnel mines.

The only comprehensive framework for mine action is the 1997 Mine Ban Convention. It addresses all aspects of the problems caused by anti-personnel mines, including the clearing of mined areas. In practice, it encompasses all explosive remnants of war as one would not refrain from clearing all explosive objects in the ground or refrain from assisting victims of any such explosives. Demining is an integral part of fulfilling the humanitarian objectives of the Convention.

Article 5 of the Convention is clear on this: ‘Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party’. The negotiators of the treaty realised that not all mine-affected countries, for various reasons, would be able to meet the deadline. Hence, provisions for extending the deadline were written into the treaty text. Requests for extensions will be considered by the States Parties to the Convention and granted if the reasons for seeking an extension are plausible and there are credible plans to meet a new deadline. However, the obligation to re-establish mine-free conditions must not be brought into doubt.

These are not some theoretical or academic ideas. The objective of Article 5 is relevant and realistic: to ensure that there are no new mine victims. This includes mine victims in the broadest sense of the word. It has been argued that some areas should not be completely demined. This is justified by financial constraints and the existence of areas where the risk of new mine victims is considered to be relatively limited. It is argued that we should aim for countries to be ‘mine-safe’ or ‘impact-free’. But what are the implications of this approach?

The arguments supporting the mine-safe and impact-free agendas presuppose a static approach. They overlook possible movements of people and landmines. We must take into account that mined areas that are given lower priority today may become areas of great concern in the future. It is difficult to predict such changes, and they can occur rapidly. There is no completely mine safe solution other than mine free. Further pondering what it actually means to be mine-safe or impact-free in practical terms is not something we believe the mine ban community should be spending time and resources on. This is about respecting the humanitarian imperative and clear legal obligations. We would not want to find ourselves on the side of those who risk undermining respect for international law.

It is far more productive to look at how the Convention is being implemented. The primary responsibility for mine action lies with each State Party. National mine action plans should be integrated into the countries’ development plans and/or other relevant national plans. National ownership and leadership must be ensured. This paves the way for international assistance for mine action, including long-term development assistance. National and international operators, partners and donors must contribute to, respect and commit themselves to national mine action plans. The national plans should encourage local and regional co-ordination to achieve efficient and effective action.

Mine action, including demining, also needs to be more cost efficient. We need to review how we work, and ensure the participation of operators in the planning and co-ordination of mine action. Inclusion of the field perspective and bringing decision making down to the lowest level possible should be encouraged. Some of the international frameworks and procedures for mine action need to be revised. The operational relevance of International Mine Action Standards and the Information Management System for Mine Action should be assessed and, if necessary, improved. Data from the Landmine Impact Survey should be used more actively and consistently in the planning and implementation processes. A review of the methodology for mine clearance, including the classification of ‘high-medium-low impact’ minefields, should be initiated to develop better means for setting priorities. There are, in other words, ways of making mine clearance more cost effective and maximising limited financial resources.

These revisions and adjustments should be based on the humanitarian needs that mine action is a response to. The 1997 Mine Ban Convention remains the most relevant and practical international instrument for addressing the problem of land mines. We should rather focus on fully implementing the Convention than encourage diversion from it.

Mine-free: don’t get confused, just finish the job
The Falkland Islands – a get out clause for the unscrupulous?

Simon Conway
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The United Kingdom was one of the first 40 states to ratify the Ottawa Convention and remains an enthusiastic member of the Universalisation Contact Group. Why then is the UK poised to breach the treaty?

Article 5 of the Convention obliges each State Party to ‘destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this convention for that State Party’. Therefore the UK is obliged to ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in the Falklands no later than 1 March 2009.

The Falklands Island Government reports that there are 117 minefields that cover a total area of 20 sq. km in the vicinity of inhabited settlements in Port Stanley, Goose Bay, Port Howard and Fox Bay. All the minefields are fenced and marked and despite their proximity to settlements (three minefields are within 1 mile of the centre of the capital Port Stanley) there has never been a civilian casualty.

The mines were either laid in peat or in sand. In both cases clearance would be technically challenging and would inevitably necessitate large-scale environmental reconstruction afterwards. Although clearance is feasible it would be extremely expensive.

The economic, social and humanitarian impact of the minefields is negligible and is likely to remain so. There is loss of amenity, particularly on Stanley Common and Cape Pembroke (Yorke Bay, Surf Bay) where areas previously used for recreation and grazing are now out of bounds but the development of the islands’ road network has meant that other beaches have become accessible and the dairy herd has moved elsewhere. The poor quality of the land means that if 60 hectares of land were cleared in Port Howard the farmer-landowner would only be able to graze a further 40 sheep, a minor addition to a flock of 40,000.

Significantly there is no enthusiasm on the part of the Falkland Islanders for clearance. Reasons given for this include the absence of economic, social and humanitarian impact, the desire to avoid casualties in the clearance process and a lack of confidence that clearance would remove 100% of the mines. They have repeatedly asserted that the funds for clearance would be better spent elsewhere, in countries where mines have a significant humanitarian impact.

In these circumstances it makes little sense to clear the mines. However to breach the treaty and not clear the mines offers a potential get out clause for the unscrupulous: States Parties are effectively absolved of any responsibility to provide security of person for their populations. They can safely claim from their capital cities that the mines in their interior are having no economic, social or humanitarian impact: pastoralists and subsistence farmers will continue to blow themselves up in minefields.

It is possible to apply for an extension of the Article 5 deadline but this requires the agreement of the majority of States Parties and obliges the applicant to provide a work plan for the completion of the task. It does not remove the obligation to clear. By applying for an extension the UK Government would be making a declaration that, despite being a nation of the North with ample financial and technical means, it remains unable to ensure the destruction of its mines. The same unscrupulous nations would, with some justification, read ‘unable’ as ‘unwilling’. The challenge for States Parties then is to reach consensus on the terms in which an extension can be agreed, without undermining the aims of the treaty.

One possible solution is for a Kyoto-style pollution credit scheme. In this context – as part of a ten-year deadline extension request – UK could commit to clear an equivalent area of mined land in the most heavily mine affected countries by the initial deadline of March 2009. To clear twenty square kilometers of land in Cambodia, Afghanistan or Angola could have a dramatic effect if specifically targeted at those mined areas that sustain the highest number of casualties. It is also relatively easily costed: in Cambodia for instance NGO’s are clearing at a cost of US$0.50 to US$2.00 per square meter. That’s forty million dollars to clear an area of Cambodia equivalent to the area of the Falklands. It is also half the area of the K5 mine-belt, the minefield that runs parallel to the Thai-Cambodian border that is one of the densest concentrations of mines in the world and the cause of a significant proportion of the world’s mine casualties.

The announcement of a ‘Falklands Initiative’ with the full backing of the Falkland Islanders at the Meeting of States Party to the Convention this November would grab the world’s attention and inject much needed impetus into the international effort to eradicate landmines.
Strong rules needed for anti-vehicle mines

By Peter Herby
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The Group of Governmental Experts of States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has been working to address the problems caused by anti-vehicle (AV) mines for more than four years. Throughout this process, the Group has been provided considerable evidence of the high human costs of AV mines during and after conflicts. Proposals have been made which, if adopted and urgently implemented, could help reduce the death, injury, starvation and disease which result from the use of these mines and from the denial of humanitarian assistance to affected communities. These include requirements that all AV mines be detectable, that some or all types possess self-destruct or self-neutralization features and that any long-lived AV mines used must be in marked and fenced areas.

However, there has been little progress made towards concluding a legally binding instrument. Several governments are opposed to new restrictions on the design or use of AV mines. Others have only expressed support for detectability and/or restrictions on remotely delivered AV mines.

Nonetheless, an effort is underway to try and find agreement at the Group’s August and November meetings. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organizations have voiced concern about the lack of progress in the Group’s work. While the proposals under consideration, could help reduce the AV mine problem, rules which are weakened by exceptions or which are so qualified as to render them voluntary practices would not be much of an improvement. If there is to be a third international agreement on landmines since 1996 it should contain clear, compelling and effective rules.

The international community has already accepted important restraints on landmines which are directly relevant to those being considered in the Group of Governmental Experts. Prior to the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel (AP) Mines in 1997, States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons adopted standards on the use and design of AP mines. While these standards were widely considered inadequate for dealing with the nature of the AP mine problem, they should be the minimum humanitarian standards for all other mines. The adoption of new use and technical standards for AV mines which are less constraining those adopted for the use, detection, self-destruct/self-neutralization and transfer of AP mines under amended Protocol II would not solve the AV mine problem on the ground.

Weak rules would also not be healthy for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons as a whole. Such rules would inevitably be followed by future proposals for amendment once their implementation proved to be inconsistent or inadequate to solve the humanitarian problem. Overlapping and potentially conflicting rules between protocols would make the Convention difficult to promote and implement.

The international community has taken important strides in dealing with the AP mine problem over the last 7 years. The time has come to take equally firm measures to reduce the civilian death, injury and suffering caused by AV mines.
Mobilising public opinion to stop cluster munitions is a challenge. The question goes: ‘why try to stop one weapon when all weapons are designed to kill and injure?’ Most people would prefer to see an end to war, but as long as it exists, we need to limit its effects on civilians. The success of the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines showed that a civil movement to place limits on war is possible.

This success has meant that most Cluster Munition Coalition members approach the campaign from a mine action perspective. Understandably, clearance and victim assistance programmes address cluster munitions primarily as dangerous producers of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Since the landmine issue garnered a lot of public attention and secured itself a slot in the agenda of mass media outlets, NGOs are understandably keen to capitalise on this both in terms of influencing government policy and securing funding for their activities.

But while they have only seeped into the media because of the way unexploded bomblets add to the landmine problem, cluster munitions pose a wider threat and require a broader response. The campaign to stop the use of cluster munitions is a campaign about developing international humanitarian law to protect civilians during armed conflict. It is essential to expand the debate beyond post-conflict problems to encompass also the targeting of cluster munitions and their immediate effects during attacks.

Opposition to clusters was first based on their indiscriminate effects during aerial bombardments in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Since then research has been thin on their immediate impact because of constraints in gathering data. Human Rights Watch was able to send a team into Iraq directly after the cessation of major hostilities in 2003, revealing the serious effects of cluster munition strikes on civilians. While such research is difficult, particularly in the case of past conflicts, it remains both possible and necessary.

Meanwhile, governments limit the discussion on cluster munitions to post-conflict problems. They acknowledge UXO problems in general and with specific reference to submunitions. They have good reason to: every unexploded submunition means a potential target missed, a potential hazard for friendly forces and a threat to civilians that undermines humanitarian credentials. Governments also have compelling arguments that they are dealing with UXO problems: negotiation of Protocol V, withdrawal of high failure rate munitions, investment in new munitions that are more reliable (in test conditions), and investment in post-conflict clearance.

Such solutions might reduce harm to civilians in some instances, but it is far from clear whether they would properly deal with the problem. If they lead to increased use of the weapon and if they are not accompanied by measures to deal with the immediate impact, they may make the problem worse.

Consequently, it is disturbing that governments are reluctant to move beyond UXO and address targeting of cluster munitions. They claim the main reason is that they want to retain maximum possible flexibility in their battlefield operations. The question is whether the risk to civilians outweighs the actual military utility of the weapon in modern conflict.

For instance, governments have noted the requirement to counter enemy attacks by massed armoured columns protected by air defences. However in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq and Kosovo, cluster munitions destroyed few armoured columns and air defences posed little or no threat.

Governments that are considering targeting as an issue have admitted the indiscriminate effects of cluster munitions: Ireland and Switzerland recently joined the ICRC in highlighting the immediate effects on civilians of cluster munitions during attacks.

It is their immediate area effects, coupled with their high rate of UXO that make cluster munitions stand out as a weapon in need of new law. A successful campaign against cluster munitions will show how they can virtually never be used consistently with IHL in modern conflict. The weapon is inappropriate because its area effects cannot be contained, it leaves dense UXO in large numbers, it cannot strike key targets with precision and it undermines hearts and minds campaigns by killing civilians.

Incendiary weapons, like the napalm that killed so many civilians in Vietnam, were controlled so strictly under the CCW that they have virtually never been used since. Such controls are the very least that States should put in place for cluster munitions. Addressing targeting through a ban on use in areas of civilian concentration, while less than ideal, would be a strong step towards ending the injustice of this weapon. Above all, while the legitimacy of cluster munitions is in question, governments must undertake not to use them.
Economics of risk

By Richard Moyes
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The unexploded legacy of conflict in Lao, Vietnam and Cambodia is increasingly being recycled into an expanding rural cash economy. High ferrous scrap prices internationally, reinforced by increased local demand, have inflated metal prices across the region – in some areas they have more than tripled since 2002. In addition, the growing availability of cheap metal detectors (US$ 12 in Lao) and the local establishment of ‘mini-mills’ for converting scrap into steel reinforcing bar (rebar) have made the trade even more efficient.

Key beneficiaries of this trade are poor rural populations, who reap a return on their investment of labour that outstrips other dry season economic activities. The presence of roving scrap metal traders in remote villages makes it one of the few ways of getting access to cash on an almost daily basis. Greater access to cash improves the local market for other consumables and in many formerly remote areas there is a growing business in iced drinks, sweets and other small luxuries. These in turn create demand for cash and encourage further cash generating activities.

The investment in scrap metal collecting is not solely one of labour, it is also an investment of risk. Increases in recorded UXO accidents over recent years in Cambodia and Lao have been attributed to the growth of the scrap metal trade. Some casualties result from accidental contact with live ordnance such as striking an item whilst digging to recover metal. Other scrap related accidents result from people attempting to dismantle live items – knowing that they cannot sell them into the trade if they still have a fuse or contain explosives.

The fact that information is gathered on ordnance accidents means that we tend to see the scrap metal trade primarily a driver of risk. However, we need to put it in its social and economic context. These are not accidents caused by ordnance, but accidents with ordnance caused by people’s engagement in an economic enterprise. This is not to deny that concern regarding ordnance accidents is legitimate. But before we devote our efforts to controlling or curtailing the scrap metal trade we need to be sure that the outcome of our interventions will be a net benefit for the rural population that we claim to be helping. This may mean we need to be more precise about the nature of the problem we want to address. Perhaps it is the role of children in the trade, or the tendency for accidents to occur in the middle of villages amongst bystanders that provide a clearer basis for intervention.

The tolerability of different risks depends upon social context. Recent decades have seen rapid changes in perspectives on risk and liability in western societies and a growing litigation culture in the west is founded upon social assumptions about the responsibilities of the state, of corporations and of professionals. The social and institutional frameworks that enable western attitudes towards risk do not exist in rural areas of South East Asia. That people’s perception of risk is relative is not solely an issue between the mine action sector and the ordnance affected rural populations, but between different communities and even families within that rural population. It is a sad fact that in some communities, or for some specific families, engaging with live ordnance to extract the scrap metal value represents a reasonable economic activity. In some areas people reject the services of the mine action sector preferring to engage with the ordnance themselves than to report it to professional teams.

The current response of the mine action sector is often to demand abstinence. This is generally explained as resulting from a fear of encouraging risk behaviour or of being held responsible for any negative outcomes that result. These explanations really serve only to hide the fact that we don’t know what best to tell people in such circumstances and that telling people what to do is the only model of assistance that we have got. In response to this impasse it may be better to set aside ‘message-based’ education as a model and look instead at facilitating discussion within communities about the risk reduction strategies people already employ and where locally appropriate boundaries between responsible and irresponsible behaviour might lie. Such an approach presents difficulties – not least the possible tension between such local devolution and national laws. However it is an approach that starts to put the responsibility for managing community safety where it belongs: with the people who have to live with ordnance as one amongst many sources of risk in their environment and economy.
Is insurance necessary for demining activities?

By Ian Irvine
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The answer must definitely be yes but is there a way of arranging it without using insurers? Mine clearance is a dangerous activity affecting not only those directly involved in clearance but also other parties and their property in the immediate vicinity. Statistics show that notwithstanding improvements in equipment and techniques it is inevitable that accidents occur causing injury, death or damage to property.

There are two principal types of insurance necessary for mine clearance activities, that necessary for deminers and support staff and that necessary for other parties, not involved in mine clearance but within the vicinity of activities where they and their property are exposed.

Individuals involved in demining activities must accept the dangers to which they are exposed and the potential threat to life and limb. Accidents may occur for which employers have no direct responsibility, therefore no legal liability, and insurance is best arranged to reflect the moral responsibility of the employer to the deminer, rather than any questionable legal liability.

It is the prerogative of demining organisations to determine the level of insurance they require for their demining staff, sometimes dictated by the Governments of countries in which demining takes place. Whilst insurance benefits may differ between organisations it is important that recommendations are given by insurance advisers, such as insurance brokers, because this will have considerable impact on premiums payable, a major consideration. In addition the accident record, and therefore claims record, of individual organisations will differ considerably and it is here that the expertise of the insurance adviser will be most relevant in securing the most competitive premiums and cover.

That demining is a hazardous activity is a matter of fact. For parties, other than deminers, who have little control over what happens it is a sad case of accepting the hazards of unexploded ordinance or the possible hazards of demining activities. Whilst liaison with local communities regarding demining activities is essential it is inevitable that accidents will occur causing injury or death to local residents or damage to their property. These risks are the responsibility of the demining organisations and can be insured under Public Liability or Third Party policies. While such policies may contain limitations relevant to particular demining activities the general intention is to provide compensation where injury, death or damage has occurred as a direct result of demining. The wording of Public Liability or Third Party policies in the UK is fairly standard and protection is granted against claims arising from an organisations legal liability, as opposed to moral responsibility, to pay compensation where, as a direct result of their mine clearance activities, local residents are injured or killed or their property is damaged. One problem facing insurers is determining legal liability when an accident occurs which, in the case of property damage, is often inevitable. For example should unexploded ordnance alongside a building be detonated in situ with inevitable damage being caused or should the ordnance be moved, which could be even more dangerous.

Taking account of local customs, laws and regulations determining legal liability is problematical and therefore leads to insurers imposing limitations in cover. It is all too easy to compare the situation with the UK where legal liability can be easily established but in countries where demining activities take place the situation is more complicated. Could legal liability be influenced by local authorities or judiciary and how would compensation or awards be calculated if influenced by prejudiced local opinion.

Problems such as these are the principal reason why Public Liability or Third Party insurance is not only difficult to arrange but also of concern as to whether or not it would really be effective. The handling of claims poses another problem in that insurers would not be happy to rely on local advice or opinion and as such would need to use external loss adjusters. They would have to obtain accurate and independent information and then be faced with determining the application of local law or customs to the consequences of the accident.

All of this explains why Public Liability or Third Party insurance is difficult to arrange and why premiums are high for what, unlike accidents to deminers, is a risk which may or may not occur. Insurers expect to make a profit underwriting insurance and if they do not they increase premiums. Insurance advisers who arrange insurance expect to receive commission for doing so. Is it therefore necessary for insurers and insurance advisers to be involved or is there possibly an alternative?

The cost of insurance is an overhead faced by all demining organisations ultimately paid for by Governments or humanitarian organisations sponsoring demining activities. Instead of paying premiums to insurers would it be advantageous to create a fund from those same premiums from which genuine claims would be paid. It would be necessary for the fund to be administered by a body formed from those organisations involved in demining activities together with representation from experienced loss adjusters or claims assessors who could be appointed on a national basis to deal with claims in their particular country. It would be in the interest of the demining organisations to undertake their activities in as secure manner as possible to minimise the likelihood of claims. National loss adjusters or claims assessors would be conversant not only with local customs, law and regulations but also how to handle spurious claims for compensation, sometimes made when the recipient knows the benefactor is an anonymous overseas insurer. There is a risk that a serious claim in the infancy of the fund could deplete it but as demining will be with us for many years a long-term attitude needs to be adopted because at the end of the day the ultimate cost of claims is going to be reflected in premiums paid. Those same Government or charitable sponsors will ultimately be picking up the cost and if this could be reduced by an efficient self-insurance scheme cutting out insurers profits and overheads together with insurance advisors commission it is a matter for which a feasibility study could easily be justified.
Nairobi Summit
135 States and over 350 NGO representatives gathered at the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World to examine the continuing humanitarian problems caused by anti-personnel mines.

On the first day, Ethiopia announced that it would ratify the Ottawa Treaty and become the 144th State Party. This positive start to the conference was followed by signs of growing acceptance of the Treaty by other key non-signatory states, including China, Indonesia and Somalia. China made the following statement:

‘Both China and States Parties to the Ottawa Convention share the same objective. China closely follows the Ottawa process and has been enhancing exchanges and cooperation with States Parties to the Convention (...) We stand ready to further expand our cooperation with the States Parties to the Convention, in order to contribute to the early elimination of landmine problems.’

Whilst the States Parties reviewed progress made to date, they also identified challenges that remain – leading to the adoption of The Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009.

The next Meeting of States Parties will be held in Croatia from 28 November to 2 December 2005.

CCW: Protocol V
In November 2003, States Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) approved a new protocol to deal with unexploded and abandoned ordnance, Protocol V. This protocol covers all conventional ordnance that may be left in the post-conflict environment (with the exception of landmines). Protocol V provides obligations regarding record keeping, provision of warnings and risk education, and requirements for the safe clearance of ordnance after conflict.

To date, however, only eight countries (Sweden, Lithuania, Sierra Leone, Croatia, Germany, Finland, Ukraine and India) have signed Protocol V, which will not enter into force until it has been ratified by 20 States Parties.

It is no credit to the CCW that after extensive negotiations States Parties are so slow to adopt the very Protocols they have been working to establish. Civil society institutions need to apply more pressure to push for ratification of Protocol V as soon as possible.

CCW: Anti-vehicle mines
As has been highlighted in this edition, the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) has been making slow progress towards any new controls over anti-vehicle mines. Whilst the slow pace of progress has been a frustration there now exists a real possibility that measures could be adopted that are so weak as to represent an effective step backwards in terms of the protection afforded to civilian populations. Civil society bodies don’t want to campaign against the adoption of new legislation to control these weapons – but if the proposed controls are so weak there may be no alternative.

In 2005, Landmine Action is implementing a new research project to assist humanitarian agencies to manage the threat of anti-vehicle mines to their field operations. Unless significantly stronger legal measures can be adopted to control anti-vehicle mines, these risk management practices will remain the only real protection for humanitarian missions working in post-conflict environments.